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Middle Range Theory and Programme Theory Evaluation: From Provenance to Practice​[1]​






This chapter discusses links between Merton’s celebrated essay, ‘On sociological theories of the middle range’ (Merton, 1967) and the role programme theories play in the world of evaluation. Merton is not normally considered an evaluation pioneer – he rates not a mention in Alkin´s (2004) study on the roots of evaluation. If evaluators do cite his work it is usually in relation to the notion of unintended side effects of purposive social actions (Merton, 1936), for we know only too well that programmes misbehave and have unforeseen consequences. Another prominent though less acknowledged concept forms the core of this chapter: middle range theories. This, for Merton, was the key strategy though which sociological explanation would progress and accumulate. It was intended to be the platform upon which the entire discipline should stand. Whether or not he was correct in this prognostication will not be discussed here, but instead, we will look into an (unforeseen) application of the middle-range model: to what extent can programmes and policies be seen as middle range theories and to what extent can evaluation be understood as the testing and refinement of such theories? The chapter has a simple, two-part structure, beginning with an overview of middle-range theory and moving to a consideration of its potential to anchor programme theory evaluation.

1. Provenance: What is middle-range theory?

‘Theories that lie between the minor but necessary working hypotheses that evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and the all-inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory that will explain all the observed uniformities of social behaviour, social organization and social change.’ (Merton, 1967: 39)

This, perhaps the most famous definition, is a statement of what middle-range theories are not, and through it everyone is familiar with what Merton opposed, namely – ‘grand theory’ and ‘piecemeal empiricism’. But, thanks to this negative formulation, middle range thinkers are also cast as a colourless, centrist party – we know full well what they are against but we cannot be quite sure what we are voting for. 

In fact, Merton is perfectly clear on the positive attributes of middle-range theory. One only has to push another thirty pages into his essay to find a concise manifesto, spelling out the overall logic in considerable detail (Merton, 1967: 68-69). The present section serves as a summary. My ambition here goes no further than to refresh the main principles by expressing them in the parlance of more recent social science methodology. I describe the main characteristics of middle-range theory in terms of three key rules. 

Rule 1. ‘Sufficient abstraction’
Merton describes the language of middle range theory thus: 

‘sufficiently abstract to deal with different spheres of social behaviour and social structure, so that they transcend sheer description or empirical generalisation’ (Merton, 1967: 68).

Here, Merton joins with the majority of social theorists in recognising abstraction as a key explanatory tool. Any event or sequence of events is open to endless descriptions and countless conceptualisations. In explaining them, social theorists have to rely on abstraction. In their heads they try to extract out various significant components or influences and figure out how they combine and interact. With such a theory in place they return to the concrete event and make sense of it. Abstraction is thus the thinking process that allows us to understand an event as an instance of a more general class of happenings. Quite literally, the reasoning goes – ‘here is a specific instance, which I can explain as a ‘case’ that falls into a broader explanatory schema’. 

The prize here is that we have a tool that permits generalisation. Abstract conceptual frameworks are the source of transferable lessons. A fruitful theory will harness together and elucidate many different empirical instances. The same explanation may be located and relocated. Social understanding matures in a process of harvesting seemingly diverse forms of social behaviour. We find ourselves thinking, ‘this master conceptual scheme, which has already succeeded in explaining a range of empirical phenomena might well be fit for purpose in explaining this new problem I’m confronting, and my work in turn might open up further compatible cases.’

Abstraction, then, is workaday tool of theory building. The problem comes with trying to pin down what Merton means by a ‘sufficient’ level of abstraction. It is easy enough to express the sentiment. Concepts have to be explanation-friendly, but he prefers conceptual fecundity to preceptual promiscuity. He wants to avoid ‘all embracing conceptual systems’ – i.e. those which are so abstract as to cover all forms of behaviour and are thus capable of explaining none of them​[2]​. 

Whilst such an analogy can convey the broad idea, there is and can be no exact formula specifying this middle level of abstraction. But what can be indicated is the objective of working at this middle level. This is illustrated in Figure 1, which illustrates both the ambition and limit of the middle-range purview. The idea of extending conceptual reach is depicted in the upper half of the diagram (1a). Merton’s theory of ‘reference group behaviour’ can be used as an example of a theory that made such a journey. The general idea is that people take the standards of significant others as a basis of monitoring their own situations. Merton first used to theory to explain the (sometimes surprising) loyalties and jealousies of US servicemen drafted in the Second World War (Stouffer et al. 1949a, 1949b). The core idea turned up again in UK industrial sociology in explaining why shipyard workers in the north of England measured their worth against local trades rather than in comparison with, say, southern stockbrokers (Runciman, 1966). And onwards the idea travelled, encompassing for instance, the observation that Parkinson’s disease victims often prefer to compare their plight to the worse off in the later stage of illness (Charlton and Barrow, 2002).

Such lateral thinking is  precisely what Merton had in mind with the idea, quoted in the epigraph to this subsection, namely that sociology should build families of middle range theories to traverse ‘different spheres of social behaviour’. Thus in figure 1a, we have the same conceptual system bridging sociology’s substantive arenas. Here, precisely, lies Merton’s claim that the theory of reference group behaviour ‘draws together findings from such disparate fields of human behavior as military life, race and ethnic relations, social mobility, delinquency, politics, education, and revolutionary activity’ (Merton, 1967: 65).

Figure 1: Extending and constricting the conceptual range
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Having made the case for ubiquity, there is no pretence that this particular theory can tell us all that there is to know about each substantive domain, for – ‘middle range theories deal with delimited aspects of social phenomenon, as indicated by their labels’ (Merton, 1967: 39). Now, the limits Merton had in mind are best understood by considering the ‘labels’ that are acknowledged throughout his essay: ‘dissonance theory’, ‘social differentiation theory’, ‘the theory of anomie’, the ‘theory of bureaucracy’, the ‘theory of mobility’, ‘role set theory’ and, of course, the ‘theory of reference groups’.  Some of these have fallen into disuse but, to take this most obvious, it is also plain that one could use the theory of bureaucracy to make explanatory headway in ‘diverse spheres’ such as military life, education, criminal justice, political systems and so on. Figure 1b depicts this second theory at work in roughly the same set of substantive fields – with the difference, of course, that the explanatory substance is changed (coverage shifts, as depicted by displacement of the inner circle). Theory one helps deal with how choices are made: theory two helps us understand how decisions are regulated. There is no all-embracing theory covering both.

Merton makes no attempt to prescribe whether there should be two, twenty or two hundred such strains of middle range theory. The point is that middle range theory one (reference groups) does not perform the same explanatory task as middle range theory two (bureaucracy) or with any such theory that conjoins later (theories of risk, consumption and so on). They all occupy their semi-independent space in the middle ground and between them they can be worked and reworked to cover sociology’s infinite terrain.

Here endeth discussion of the first desideratum of middle range theory. Despite being the feature that gives the strategy its name, one is left with a rather rough and ready guideline for identifying this middling pitch and scope. In truth, it is not a particularly restrictive canon​[3]​ - its main aim being to recognise the soaring contribution that abstraction provides in explanation building, whilst at the same time making us beware of conceptual skyscrapers. 

Rule 2. ‘Logical derivation’

Merton describes the composition of middle range theory thus: 

‘Limited sets of assumptions from which specific hypotheses are logically derived and confirmed by empirical investigation’ (Merton, 1967: 68)

Much is packed into this little sentence and much of the explanatory punch of middle range theory resides here. Above all, what is sought is the intelligibility and precision that comes from the formulation of theories with a clear propositional structure​[4]​. 

Let us commence with the object of attention for middle range propositions. For Merton these are ‘empirical uniformities’. As ever, the term is carefully chosen. As we navigate through life we note that it has its patterns and trends: some countries are more warlike than others: some institutions have greater longevity that others; some groups grab more resources that others​[5]​. These rhythms and associations of social life are constant enough. They become part of our experience and can be confirmed, up to a point, with empirical evidence. However, we are never particularly surprised when the associations do not work out as expected. Occasionally other countries, different institutions and rival groups make the running. Social science, in other words, has to cope with a little paradox with which we are all able to live, namely when the ‘exception proves the rule’. 

These badly-behaved uniformities, or what today might be termed ‘demi-regularities’ (or ‘demi-regs’ for short, Lawson, 1997), are the object of middle-range explanation​[6]​. As noted, they are not perfect regularities; they are not enduring empirical generalisations; they are not social laws. Searching for empirical association does not produce explanation it merely commences it. What the middle range explanation has to deliver is an explanation of why there is perceptible uniformity. And in doing so, that explanation has also to account for this now-you-see-it-now-you-don’t quality of the demi-reg.

This mission is handled by building theories supposition by supposition. The basic task is to provide a ‘set of assumptions’ lying behind the observed associations and from which they can ‘be derived’ (Merton, 1967: 41). It ‘introduces a ground for prediction which is more secure than mere empirical extrapolation from previously observed trends’ (Merton, 1967: 152 my emphasis). Middle range theory, in other words, deals in generative causal explanation (Bhaskar, 1978; Harré, 1986: Elster, 1989) by providing an account of the underlying mechanisms that give rise to demi-regs​[7]​. The elemental explanatory proposition of middle range theory is illustrated in figure 2 and takes the following form: uniformities of behaviour (U) come about because they are generated by a common underlying mechanism (M). For instance, in terms of our working examples, judgements of worth in wage-bargaining (U​) and of well-being during terminal illness (U) are made because such reasoning is rooted in comparisons with reference groups of which people are members (M). 

This ‘limited assumption’ about constrained choice, namely that people think, see and feel things from the standpoint peculiar to the group in which they participate takes is place as the elemental (and elementary) proposition about relative deprivation in the middle range theory of reference group behaviour. The basic mechanism can then provide further service in explaining why, for instance, disaster victims, though substantially deprived, tend to have first thoughts (U) for fellow sufferers who have lost lives or livelihoods. 
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It is important to stress that at this stage our theory is a mere fledgling – little more than basic imagery. We know that the uniformities foregathered under its wing are mere demi-regs. We know from the empirical research that Merton scrutinised that there are significant examples in which people compare their worth against an out-group. Returning to the example from The American Soldier, the broad tendency was that measured themselves against fellows of the same rank, region and race. But if that soldier happened to be a non-combatant, he often felt that the Army favoured the fighting forces: if the conscript happened to be well educated he tended to compare himself to graduates in civvy-street. Once muted, the tendency is for such exceptions-to-the-rule to become rather conspicuous. For instance, in the Parkinson’s disease study already cited, the authors discern a smaller cluster of sufferers who are extremely resentful about loss of function in comparing themselves with the able-bodied (Charlton and Barrow, 2002).

In short and in other words, the entire theory of reference group behaviour is also expressed in terms of what, today, would be described as ‘contingent causation’ (Sayer, 2000, ch.1) and which is illustrated in Figure 3. The theory holds to a slightly revised core assumption, namely – that measures of worth and satisfaction are made in reflecting upon some salient comparison group. But this mechanism (M) can lead to different preferences (U1, U2) according to whether membership (C1) or non-membership (C2) of the yardstick group is the key to self-evaluation.


Figure 3.  Contingent causation











This conundrum, in turn, leads to an enlargement of the ‘logical structure’ of the theory to include propositions about the different contexts or conditions (C1, C2, … CN), which are influential in determining whether comparison groups are proximate or distant. Merton tackled the puzzle by a series of propositional extensions to the basic model, one of them examining in much more detail the simple distinction between membership and non-membership of social group. As far as the individual is concerned life is sometimes lived on the inside and sometimes on the outside of the plethora of existing groups. The auxiliary theory goes on to describe a more complex set of possible affiliations to these groups. Table 1 posits some key configurations: 

Table 1: Outsiders: a typology of aspirations to group membership of ‘eligibles’ and ‘non-eligibles’. 

Attitude toward membership	Eligible formembership	Ineligible formembership
Aspire to belong	1.Candidate for membership	2. Marginal Man
Indifferent to affiliation	3. Potential member	4. Detached non-member
Motivated not to belong	5. Autonomous non-member	6. Antagonistic non-member
Source: Derived from Merton (1968, p.344)

The table concentrates upon non-members and proposes there are some significant distinctions within such a station. First of all, it is feasible to differentiate between those who (by dint of qualification or characteristic) are ineligible for the in-group and those who are eligible but continue to remain unaffiliated. This simple contrast between entitlement and disqualification from in-group membership is represented in the two columns to the right of the table. The supplementary theory also takes into consideration the question of attitude to group membership of these non-members. Do they want to belong to the in-group? An approximate threefold distinction in this respect (aspiration, indifference, opposition) is depicted across the three rows of the table. 

Putting the two factors (eligibility and attitude) together then generates a repertoire of abstract propositions about different forms of reference group behaviour, according to the actor’s membership of the six constituent cells. In cell 1 we have non-members who both aspire to and are eligible for in-group membership. Reference group theory posits that they are likely to choose that in-group as a yardstick for their behaviour and to benefit for doing so. Cell 2 members, by contrast, may want to and attempt to copy the values and behaviours of the in-group but the theory advises that they are likely remain shunned and on its margins​[8]​ because of the lack of some crucial membership attribute. Cell 3 and cell 4 consists of people who are wholly unconcerned with in-group membership. ‘They are entirely indifferent to its orbit. It constitutes no part of their reference group’ (Merton, 1968: 345). Neither of these two groups is likely to reach out to or take cognisance of the in-group. The main difference is that those in cell 3 may simply be more adjacent to its ambit; they are more likely to receive overtures from the in-group. The bottom row identifies outsiders who temperamentally oppose membership of an in-group, but differentiates them according to whether they are eligible (cell 5) or non-eligible (cell 6) to join that group in the first place. Both regard the in-group as a negative reference group. But the eligibility distinction raises the Simmelian hypothesis, that the qualified individuals who expressly reject membership are more likely to pose a threat to that group than are the antagonists automatically disbarred from membership. The 5’s self-chosen autonomy provides the condition for effective hostility.

In this manner, the table builds an explanatory tool supplying a degree of predictive power about what will happen in encounters between in-group and out-group members. According to location of an out-group actor in the conceptual matrix of eligibility and attitude, one can expect a whole range of dispositions to the in-group ranging from chummy acquiesce to downright hostility. I will come to examples of this explanatory potential in substantive research later in the chapter. Here, it is the methodological point that must be emphasised. Table 1 exemplifies another key expectation about middle range theoretical propositions, namely that they must be formalised and codified​[9]​. Statements specifying which causal mechanism is released in which context and with which outcome are articulated in a clear and explicit explanatory framework. The table is a formal embodiment of the theory.

Before we depart their logical structure, yet another facet of middle range propositions must be introduced, namely the formulation of explanations utilising ‘configurational causation’. This is another term that has become prominent in methodological discourse over recent years, largely due to the work of comparative sociologists (e.g. Ragin, 1987). Basically, the suggestion is to extend the idea of contingent causation (figure 3) by understanding that empirical outcomes are shaped not by one, and not by two prevailing contexts – but that they emerge out of the conjunction of a whole raft of pre-existing conditions (as illustrated in figure 4). 


















In classic comparative-historical sociology (Moore, 1966) this configurational format is used routinely. Moore explains, for example, that Britain’s early industrialisation was encouraged by a range of coterminous conditions (namely, weak aristocracy (C1), colonial empire to exploit (C2), technological advance (C3), strength of the commercial middle classes (C4), displaced cheap labour (C5), and so on). In developing middle range theories, Merton uses the same idea by giving the theorist the (incessant) task of working systematically though the full range of contextual feature that condition the action of a causal mechanism. 

Reference group theory begins with the idea that behavioural choices are made in the way people reflect upon some salient comparison group is added to this via further propositions, covered in Table 1, about how ‘eligibility’ and ‘attitudes’ shape who and what is salient (CA). The theory is then further developed by adding auxiliary propositions about the constraints that flow from the nature of in- and out-groups. Are they relatively ‘open’ or ‘closed’ (CB)? Are they relatively ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ (CC)?  Thereafter comes the influence of several further factors that one might collect together under the heading of group demographics (CN). What are the ‘relative and absolute sizes’ of in-group and out-group? Are there further ‘relevant sub-divisions’ within the groups?  What about the ‘number and relative stratification’ of these groups? All such contexts, singly and collectively, are reckoned to frame reference group decisions.

I have indicated the gathering of some of these conditioning forces in figure 4 but, because of space considerations, I make no attempt here to spell out the associated set of explanatory propositions. As a miniature illustration, one might consider the fate of our unqualified but aspirational ‘marginals’, who gear up appearances in order to bang on the door of the in-group only to be shunned for lacking the specific characteristic for entry. These efforts, especially if persistent, are hypothesised to be somewhat less futile if the in-group happens to be ‘informally’ (as opposed, of course, to ‘formally’) organised. This supplementary explanatory proposition adds a further layer of complexity, examining not only the aspirations and eligibility of the out-group, but the coherence of the in-group. A whole raft of further contextual permutations is discussed in detail in Merton (1968, Ch XI). The obligation stands, of course, that each and every supplementary feature is conjoined to the developing theory in an explicitly formalised and fully codified manner. 

Rule 2 about the ‘logical derivation’ of explanatory statements turns out to be the most exacting requirement of middle range theory. The rule is that theory must be constructed in the form of: i) a system of main and auxiliary causal propositions, which should in turn be: ii) formal, iii) generative, iv) contingent, and v) configurational. Because Merton originated this explanatory machinery via working examples rather than in a detailed methodological protocol, I rather suspect that the power and precision of middle range propositional structures have never been fully appreciated. But it is through this mighty apparatus that social science has a fighting chance of getting to grips with the ever-changing complexities of social behaviour.

Rule 3. ‘Adaptive, cumulative explanations’

Merton describes the fallibility of middle range theory thus: 

‘The middle range orientation involves the specification of ignorance. Rather than pretend to knowledge where in fact it is absent, it expressly recognises what still must be learned in order to lay the foundations for still more knowledge.’ (Merton, 1967: 68)

Here is a rather important admission. Often, middle range theory may be, can be and will be wrong. To understand this point and to fathom why this is seen as a virtue, we need to go back to the object of middle range sociological inquiry. On Merton’s view, the primary task is to explain ‘empirical uniformities’. This is a priority, however, that is ceaseless and changing because these uniformities (or demi-regularities) are themselves transformative and transforming. 

These empirical raw materials of social inquiry change over time because of the presence of ‘dynamic social mechanisms’ (Merton, 1968: 182). People are cognisant of social regularities and are thus capable of changing them. Indeed such transformations happen all the time through the intended and untended mechanisms captured in Merton’s famous essay on self-fulfilling and self-destroying processes (1936). In terms of the standing example on reference group behaviour, what this dynamic scenario anticipates is that the battle of wills between in-group and out-group, although patterned, will never remain stable.

As far as middle range theory is concerned, the passage of time will always throw up such empirical anomalies. And for Merton (also Popper (1963) and Campbell (1974)) it is these discrepancies, these failures of the existing explanatory apparatus that drive inquiry forward. The response, however, is not to start their investigation from scratch but to draw the apparent incongruities into an overall pattern. This process is depicted in figure 6. 

What is described here is the cumulation of inquiry and, accordingly, this figure builds on the idea of trying conjoin different empirical instances under the same explanatory framework (as originally described in figure 1). Both figures capture the idea that middle range theory tries to encompass an ever-widening kaleidoscope of empirical uniformities. But figure 5 reveals the driver – ‘new data exert pressure for the elaboration of a conceptual scheme’ (Merton, 1968: 162). The figure takes us through three imaginary stages in such an inquiry. 

In the upper sequence, we have a successful theory (1a) explaining a number of empirical instances (represented by the small circles) about a delimited range of behaviour (represented by the medium circle) drawn from different spheres of social behaviour (represented by the lager circles). The line of inquiry of inquiry falters, however, when the researcher comes upon an anomalous case (the sequence of benign grey circles ends in discrepant black circle). Calling on a somewhat potted history of reference group theory again, this corresponds, say, to the moment when it is observed that aspirations are sometimes directed at an out-group rather than the familiar loyalties of an in-group. 

The anomaly is hardly fatal, however. We know that the original pattern is a mere ‘demi-reg’ and an auxiliary theory can be manufactured to account for the different kinds of outcome. This step has been described above in table 1, with its addition of the shaping forces of the outsider’s ‘eligibility’ and ‘attitude’ in explaining reference group choices. This revised theory (1b) then goes forth, with its more complex structure (double circle) able to account for compound regularities across a range of empirical instances. Valuable as the adaptation is, we know that it too will have limited scope and eventually we will encounter an empirical case that does not fit (enter another black circle). In reference group theory, this might correspond to the discovery of opposite fortunes within seemingly the ‘same’ configuration. In our simplified version of reference group theory, this might correspond to a case whereby women (as aspirational outsiders) sometimes succeed and sometimes fail to break though an occupational glass ceiling. The explanation of why it is easier to become a senior female sociologist that senior female surgeon turns, no doubt, on characteristics of the in-group. This feature, say the difference in the way professions are able to regulate and apply closure, is added to the emerging theory (the triple circle). The process continues. Theory 1c wends its merry way, turns the next empirical corner, only to be thwarted again.








































This dynamic is crucial to middle range theory building. Theories are tested and refined but never closed and completed. Accordingly, inquiry never starts from scratch and suddenly acquires pedigree. Middle-range investigations always have a history and begin at 1b, 1c, 1d … 1n, and so on. A scaffold consisting of some core imagery and a series of secondary propositions will already have been generated to explain a widening patchwork of regularities. This explanatory framework is not immutable because of the vexatious fact of social change. Groups are not locked into the patterns predicted by the theory of reference group behaviour because part of that theory is about how groups struggle to overcome such constraints. The theory tries to take account of how alliances and choices may become ordered and reordered. The reach of such an explanatory schema at any given point will be limited. We cannot predict the realignments but we can track them and remember the trail.

With this image of the dogged, never-ending pursuit of truth in mind, we turn to evaluation research. An uneasy affinity with the ‘what works?’ agenda should be obvious. In many ways, the history of programme planning is story of the policy maker lighting on a bright idea, a following flush of success and enthusiasm, then familiarity and failure breeding contempt, leading to the birth of the next big idea. The trick, it would seem, is to turn the journey into a virtuous rather than a vicious circle. 

2. Practice: middle range theory and programme theory evaluation

Truth to tell and despite its birthplace, middle range theory has not come to dominate, underpin, or even significantly inform sociological research. But this is no funeral oration. I am here to pronounce the movement alive and well. It has merely jumped ship. The result is that intrepid sociologists who seek to ply an accumulative, propositional, formal and falsifiable trade often do so under a different banner. 
One such dissident cluster can be identified under the headings of ‘policy research’ or ‘evaluative research’ or even ‘applied social research’. That I should identify such a habitat for middle-range theory would present no surprise to Merton​[10]​. His 1967 essay identifies many renowned scholars who ‘assent’ to the strategy. Amongst the devotees number T H Marshall (who, contemporaneously with Merton, used ‘stepping stones of the middle range’ to marshal his own theories of welfare and citizenship) and P H Rossi (who, somewhat later, invented a middle-range, theory-driven approach to evaluation research).

‘Programme theory’ equals ‘middle range theory’

This section of the chapter goes on provide concrete examples of evaluation research as middle range theory building. But first a little more should be said about the allure of the middle range to the policy scientist. The main attraction is that policies are theories incarnate. This notion is captured in a familiar phrase from evaluation research, namely the ‘programme theory’ (Rogers et al 2000; Leeuw, 2003). Interventions begin life in the heads of policy makers, pass into the hands of practitioners and, sometimes, into the hearts and minds of programme subjects. These conjectures originate with an understanding of what gives rise to inappropriate behaviour, or to discriminatory events, or to inequalities of social condition. Thoughts then move to speculate how changes may be made to these patterns. The interventions that follow are always inserted into existing social systems that are reckoned to underpin and account for present problems. It is supposed that changes in patterns of behaviour, events or conditions will then be generated by bringing fresh inputs to that system in the hope of disturbing and re-balancing it.

This leads us to my core claim that programme theories share all of the characteristics of middle-range theory. Note well, that in saying this I am not imagining high levels of sociological rigour in the corridors of power. At launch, policies are often half-baked and politically expedient. The thesis being pursued is about the longer term and about an opportunity. In the evidence based policy movement, great store is set by the idea of creating policy systems that learn. My contention is that policy and programme learning should mirror the continual process of testing and refining middle range theories just described​[11]​. I make a preliminary case for the remarkable family resemblance by recalling some of the identifiers of middle range theory as set down in the previous section: 

Uniformities and ‘demi-regs’. These are the objects of attention in middle range theory and theory-driven evaluation. The problems, inequalities, pathologies and misdemeanours that confront policy makers are usually substantial, significant and longstanding - but are regarded nonetheless as demi-regularities. The fact that they are open to explanation means that they are open to change. 

Generative causation. This is the motor of explanation in middle range theory and theory-driven evaluation. Middle range theories provide the ‘grounds for uniformities’; programme theories explicate the grounds for change. Programmes do not work in and of themselves; they work through the reasoning of programme subjects. All programmes have a common underlying mechanism, namely to insert resources in the expectation (i.e. theory) of changing the choices open to subjects.

Conjoining spheres of behaviour. This is the sphere of operations of middle range theory and theory-driven evaluations. Middle range theories deliberately traverse the substantive fields of social enquiry. Policy and programme theories are also ubiquitous. Ideas like ‘incentivisation’, ‘target setting’ and ‘naming and shaming’ are to be found right across the policy waterfront. Middle-range thinking can avoid the ‘silo’ mentality that sometime exists in government departments.

Contingent causation. This idea exemplifies and constitutes the scope condition on the explanatory power of middle range theory and theory-driven evaluation. Middle range theories are only intended to explain ‘delimited ranges of social phenomena’. Likewise, intervention theories never provide panaceas; programmes only work in limited conditions. A major task of theory-driven evaluation is to differentiate the efficacious and non-efficacious contexts.

Configurational causation. This idea exemplifies and creates the propositional structure of middle range theory and theory-driven evaluation. Empirical outcomes emerge out of the conjunction of a whole raft of pre-existing conditions and middle range explanations have to build iteratively to account for them. In the same way, theory-driven evaluations evolve – attempting to explain for whom, in what circumstances, in what respects, and with what staying power a programme works.

Unintended consequences. These create the disappearing horizon in middle range theory and theory-driven evaluation. Middle range theory assumes that the social order is always disturbed by people wanting to change it but that the intended courses of action is not in their control. Programme theories are also beset by unintended consequences and their explanatory power is always provisional. Interventions that once worked become fatigued and routinised, and thus cease to work.

Specification of Ignorance. This is the spur to development of middle range theory and theory-driven evaluation. Empirical anomalies are commonplace. They lead to theory failure and require the extension of the standard repertoire of middle range propositions. Programme theory failure is also routine in policy making, and such dissapointments call for the respecification of theory and the remaking of interventions. An evaluation regime that is sensitive to the reasons for programme failure can be just as valuable as one aiming to spotlight success.


Reference group theory rediscovered

Having established an infrastructural identity, this section goes on to spell out the practical parallels between the two modes of analysis: middle range theory building and theory-driven evaluation. The illustrations called upon emanate from my own work in the field of ‘research synthesis’ (Pawson, 2006). Such a strategy, also known as ‘systematic review’, seeks to come to an overall judgement on the merit of a family of programmes. The basic idea is that in the modern world of public welfare the same interventions tend to be tried and tried again, and researched and researched again. Systematic review faces the challenge of unearthing all the trials and synthesising all the evidence on a particular policy theme in order to come to a more robust and considered judgement on whether, why and when it works​[12]​. This task is of great interest here because, of course, it speaks directly to our central theme about the building and refinement of social explanation. 





Public disclosure policies rest on the idea that many forms of non-compliant behaviour (ranging from under-performance to criminal deviance) may be corrected by disclosing the identity of the recalcitrants to the general public. One reason for its ubiquity, of course, is that the core idea carries substantial public and media support. It is blessed with a catch phrase, ‘naming and shaming’, that is both easy on the ear and a pushover to promote, for who would oppose ceding knowledge to the people.  A complete listing of such interventions could take up several pages but, in order to illustrate the diversity, this vignette will concentrate on four examples: 

1.	Local press adverts for council rent arrears (poll tax non-payment) 
2.	Sex offender registration (‘Megan’s Law’) 
3.	School ‘league tables’ on exam performance
4.	Car crime indices and car safety reports 

Despite their popularity, the schemes in general and these four in particular have met with modest success. I provide some illustrative data on their varied and limited efficacy before producing a reference group theory to account for the mixed picture. First, a reminder of the initial programme theory – public disclosure rests on the successful implementation of the following sequence:

i)	Identification: the performance/behaviour in question is observed and then classified, measured, rated, ranked, and verified.
ii)	Naming: information on, and the identity of, the failing/deviant party is disclosed, publicised, published and disseminated.
iii)	Public Sanction: the broader community acts on the disclosure in order to shame, reprimand, reproach, censure, and control the named party.
iv)	Recipient Response: behavioural change follows the sanction, with subjects being shamed, regretful, penitent, contrite, restrained and, hopefully, re-integrated.

What does the evidence say? In brief, and concentrating on the final item, recipient response, the following picture emerges:

1. Publicity for ‘poll tax’ protesters

Disclosure for ‘non-payment’ is a workaday target of shaming sanctions. Public authorities put it to use by naming individuals in payment arrears for TV licences, council tax bills and, most infamously in the UK, the ‘poll tax’ or Community Charge. ‘Naming’, in this instance, took the form of final warnings followed by the circulation of the names and addresses of defaulters in the local newspapers. It is the historical and political context of the measure that is of interest here. The Community Charge had a stormy legislative passage. It was subject to much protest and was subsequently amended and then eventually withdrawn, being deemed ‘uncollectable’. Having ceremonially ‘burned their bills’, ardent protesters would typically face a reminder, a fourteen day notice-to-pay, a second letter, a summary warrant, a court appearance, a frozen bank account, wage arrest, property sequistration, and so on. Accounts of the protest show how resistance was mounted at each stage (Burns, 1992). In the heat of this action, local qualitative accounts (Reynolds, 1992) reveal that many defaulters were overjoyed when their names appeared in the press. There was a craving to be ‘named’ in these circles. Public disclosure, in this context, was counterproductive – it became a badge of honour.  

2. Sex offender registration – Megan’s Law

Megan’ Law was introduced following public revulsion about the danger of reoffence by released sex offenders. The solution was to create high-profile, locally-targeted, public registers of high-risk offenders. Having identified released sex offenders, the programme theory assumes that the stigmatising effects of publicity will guard against reoffence. Or, failing this, recidivism is reckoned to reduce with the offender recognising decreased opportunities and higher risk of arrest. The evidence, by contrast, indicates that ‘special bulletin notification’ offenders are resentful of or scared by public attention. Their modus operadi is to lie low and this instinct remains despite the public gaze. Amongst the consequences are non-compliance with registration processes and displacement to other localities. Hebenton and Thomas’s (1997:12) discover that in the early years of the law compliance rates varied between 80% in Washington and 30% in Oklahoma. Petrosino and Petrosino’s (1999) Boston case study shows that 50% of stranger-predatory offences emanate from out of state (and thus out of range of notification). And what of the overall efficacy of disclosure policy for preventing predatory attacks? Perhaps not surprisingly, this evidence also shrinks away. Quasi-experimental evaluations comparing re-offence rates for matched samples of offenders released before and after the enactment of the law show that the rates remained static (Schram and Milloy, 1995).

3. School league tables

‘School league tables’ or ‘school performance data’, as they are officially known, have been published in the UK since 1992. They measure the performance of schools in public examinations (GCSE and ‘A’ level) at the minimum school leaving age and at the end of post-compulsory secondary education. The programme theory is another variant of naming and shaming. Simply by virtue of publishing comparative information it is assumed that schools will compete, thereby driving up standards. Indeed, the evidence (Ball, 2003) points to a great deal of time and energy being consumed on league table position in schools, particularly with respect to the headline indicators such as ‘percentage achieving 5 or more GSCE passes at grades A*-C’. Of particular concern here is the response of schools in the middle and lower ranks of the tables. Although studies reveal the stirring of long-term ambitions to improve school fabric, staffing and intake, a tactical response is also detected. Short-term improvement is only possible by manipulating the performance data (West and Pennel, 2000: Wiggins and Tymms, 2002; Wilson et al, 2006). To this end a range of ‘gaming’ measures have been uncovered: increases in school exclusion for disruptive pupils (i.e. low achievers); targeting teaching resources on marginal C/D pupils; entering students on vocational courses which have higher pass rates and higher league table tariffs; decreasing exam entry for the poorest candidates – the baseline (%A*-C) measure being calculated against numbers entered for examination.

4. Car crimes index

Vehicle crime used to account for one fifth of all UK criminal activity recorded by the police, though this proportion has fallen over recent years. The cost of car crime is not borne by the manufacturers themselves, with the result that, other things being equal, producers will sell vehicles that are valuable yet vulnerable. One potential mechanism for removing this complacency was ‘shaming’. And the introduction in 1992 by the Home Office of the Car Theft Index​[14]​ (Houghton, 1992) was an attempt to make the idea manifest. The index brings to the public’s attention the make, model and year of vehicles most at risk of being stolen. From 1993 there was a steady decline in car theft, following the introduction by manufacturers of a range of security features. In the early period of the index, new and recent model cars were stolen more often, the pickings being obviously much greater. The position is currently reversed with cars lacking the now standard, manufacturer-installed, high-tech immobilisers becoming the favoured target. None of these overall shifts, however, demonstrate a shaming causal nexus. The real and direct effect of disclosure is to be found in the reactions of particular companies to the first wave of publicity. One manufacturer in particular was caught in a wave of bad publicity. Seven ranges of cars were identified as ‘high risk’ in the ’92 report and Ford made six of them. Following this disclosure, the company made the decision to transform vehicle security (the introduction of an entirely new key system) and from ’92 to ’94, the index reveals a 60% improvement in the rate of theft across the Ford range.

In summary, one can say of our quartet of case studies that public notification always unleashes a reaction. But outcomes do not quite run to plan. The programme theory hits and misses. As a pocket description, one can say that the actual sequence of events across the four cases goes something more like the following: ‘naming and swaggering’, ‘naming and evading’, ‘naming and gaming’, and only in the last case do we approach ‘naming and shaming’. Note well, that I am not arguing that there is a perfectly uniform reaction to public notification in each case – not all payment protesters react in the same way, ditto for our other cases. What is claimed, however, is that there is a discernible overall pattern and that these very diverse reactions need explaining as a core evaluative task.

To do so, I look to reference group theory. As with most of public policy, an in-group attempts to mend the ways of an out-group, in this instance by raising public awareness of the latter’s failings. It turns out that a popular policy meets with mixed success because the sensibilities of the target group are not taken sufficiently into account. And these sensibilities map remarkably well onto the distinctions and propositions of reference group theory. To show this I present table 2, which is a reworking of the attitudes-and-eligibility configurations of table 1. Recalling that theory, we expect highly resistant behaviour from antagonistic non-members (group 6) to overtures from the in-group – and this propensity for a further fight is observed rather pointedly in the reactions to publicity of the poll tax protesters. Detached non-members (group 4), by contrast, avoid all forms of in-group contact and this striving for invisibility is seen even under the fierce spotlight of Megan's Law. Many examples of the tortured complicity of marginal non-members (group 2) have been given in this chapter, and the twisting and turning of lowly ranked but aspirational schools under the league table regime is another fitting example. Finally, we come to aspirational eligibles (group 1). The theory suggests that such individuals and bodies will want to protect their position and so will comply positively, as did Ford, under threats to their reputation. 

Table 2: Mapping responses to shaming sanctions onto the typology of out-groups  
Attitude toward membership	Eligible formembership	Ineligible forMembership
Aspire to belong	1.Candidate for membershipCompliance	2. Marginal non-memberComplicity
Indifferent to affiliation	3. Potential member	4. Detached non-memberAvoidance
Motivated not to belong	5. Autonomous non-member	6. Antagonistic non-memberResistance





Creating a close relationship with an experienced and knowledgeable guide is seen as an all-purpose resource offering both opportunities for advancement and solutions to disadvantage. For my second visit to modern social policy, I examine a key exemplification of this theme in the form of ‘youth mentoring programmes’. It is supposed that such close and natural bonding can meet challenges that more formal and institutional interventions fail to overcome. The most challenging of such objectives is known as ‘engagement mentoring’. Disaffected youths from disadvantaged backgrounds are the target for such schemes and the ambition is to bring them to ‘workforce readiness’.

The programme theory assumes that there will not be one almighty leap into training, employment and equanimity, but that mentoring will facilitate the change through different mechanisms and by different stages as follows:
1.	Befriending: creating bonds of trust and the sharing of new experiences so that the mentee recognises the legitimacy of other people and other perspectives
2.	Direction-setting: promoting further self-reflection through the discussion of alternatives so that mentees reconsider their loyalties, values and ambitions
3.	Coaching: coaxing and cajoling the mentee into acquiring the skills, assets, credentials and testimonials required to entry the mainstream
4.	Sponsoring: advocating and networking on behalf of the mentee to gain the requisite insider contacts and work opportunities

In short, and with an apt measure of pragmatism, the theory assumes that the road to engagement is a long march. In this instance, I introduce reference group theory early into the piece in order to show that its propositional structure can be adapted and extended (as figure 5) to explain a phalanx of emerging evidence on the success and failures of youth mentoring schemes. The initial conceptual framework is depicted in Table 3. One again the template is the attitudes-and-eligibility configurations of Table 1. The basic imagery involves recasting the above sequence of steps as a reference group journey. 

Table 3: Objectives of youth mentoring interventions superimposed
 onto the out-group typology 
Attitude toward membership	Eligible formembership	Ineligible formembership
Aspire to belong	Sponsoring1.Candidate for membership	Coaching2. Marginal non-memberDirection-setting
Indifferent to affiliation	3. Potential member	4. Detached non-memberBefriending
Motivated not to belong	5. Autonomous non-member	6. Antagonistic non-member

Youth entering the programme are unemployed and untrained but, typically, they also experience family disruption, have wretched school records, and have begun entanglement in crime/drugs. So, by temperament, they may well also be hostile and hindering. In sum, they begin as ‘antagonistic non-members’ (6). Overnight conversion is disregarded and the theory assumes than engagement with the mainstream begins with mundane, everyday contact or ‘befriending’. By sharing time and shooting the breeze with a person outside the youth’s normal circle, it is supposed that out-group antagonism gives way to the beginnings of detachment (4). The trust established in the initial stage then enables consideration of the youth’s options. The mentor becomes involved in ‘direction-setting’, generating self-reflection in the mentee about a wider set of identities and options, a process which it is hoped will end with a degree of readiness to participate in the mainstream (2). Youth in such a situation are still unqualified and thus highly marginal. Nevertheless, they are now prepared to turn the corner (diagramatically and metaphorically). The route to insider status is still a long one and mentors require knowledge and wherewithal (and fortitude) to urge the mentee into the training system and onto job opportunities. Via such periods of ‘coaching’ and ‘sponsoring’ youth move to the threshold of insider status (1). So the theory goes.

Having this basic framework in mind, it is then possible to extend the logical structure via a series of hypotheses about the feasibility of such a journey (and thus also about both the potential success and failures of such programmes). The available research gathered in the systematic review then acts as an evidence repository to test these conjectures. Below is a sample of conjectures, expressed as reference group propositions, together with brief references to the literature that lend them support (with a reminder that the full review can be found in Pawson, 2006; ch6). 

Seven hypotheses are developed outwards from the following central predicament:

The move from antagonism to attachment requires the mentor to respond to the reasoning and loyalties experienced in four different reference group positions. Any individual mentor will thus struggle to have the capacity and resources to prompt all of the envisaged transformations. The broad consequence is that we might expect schemes with many broken journeys as reference group loyalties vie with the ambitions of the scheme. 

Hence:
1.	The most successful youth programmes in terms of educational and job achievement may well work by recruiting mentees who have already made gains in the journey from antagonism to marginality. Evidence on this score comes from the Big Brother Big Sister (BBBS) programme in the US. It is widely regarded as the most successful youth mentoring intervention. But accounts of BBBS implementation (Grossman and Tierney, 1998) also reveal that participants have to fulfil a series of eligibility requirements. At entry they must: endure a substantial waiting list to gain admission; complete an assessment to ensure a minimal level of social skills; pass preliminary training and orientation sessions; and gain parental approval and guarantees to support to participation.
2.	Mentors who are especially capable in one role may lack competence in another phase of the long move. Evidence on this score comes from Philip et al.’s (2004) comparison of three Scottish schemes. Mentors particularly adept at befriending had neither the skills nor the appetite to move beyond that role, ‘we are not an authority figure, we are not police, we are not social work, we are purely there to give them a bit of fun and take them out of the home situation for a wee while’.
3.	Success in one mentoring role may create antagonism with other ambitions of the programme. Evidence on this score comes from Colley’s (2003) study of a national UK scheme (‘New Beginnings’). She reports on cases in which mentors are able to provide high levels of emotional support, showing how this attachment may even transmute into sympathy with hostile mentees, who fail to co-operate with what they see as belittling training opportunities and miserable job prospects offered under the government programme.
4.	Mentors have to be authentic and their advice feasible. Those who are most successful in promoting the full sequence of engagement moves are the ones one who have traversed the same pathway. Evidence on this score comes from Philip et al. (2004) and Shiner et al. (2004) whose investigations of the motives of successful mentors reveals that they wish to see mentees emulate their own escape from disruptive homes, criminal convictions, etc. Their stratagem, accordingly, often embodies the idea, ‘been there, done that’.
5.	Mentoring involves engaging with the sources and roots of the mentee’s dispositions and success on this score requires some positive contact with the wider membership of the mentee’s reference group.  Evidence on this score comes from Rhodes et al’s (2002) study of the BBBS programme: ‘if parents feel that they are involved in, as opposed to supplanted by the provision of additional adult support, they are likely to reinforce mentors’ positive influence’. Despite its outward reputation, mentoring is shown to extend considerably beyond a one-to-one activity.
6.	The mentor’s lack of capacity in any one role may be compensated for by integrating their role in a wider programme of youth support. Evidence on this score comes from Shiner et al.’s (2004) evaluation of the UK ‘Mentoring Plus’ programme, which highlighted moments of synergy between emotional and aptitudinal support. Whilst mentors were not responsible for the training elements of the programme, those who succeeded in instilling resilience in their mentees were the ones with a deep understanding of the content and thus the demands of educational provision. 
7.	Mentoring works on and via the reasoning process of the mentees. It cannot immediately change their material circumstances and progress will be chequered as material circumstances continue to bite. Evidence on this score comes from Shiner et al.’s (2004) case studies. Progress is not only halting but also non-linear. Given the circles in which they move mentees have recurring battles with authorities, bust ups with family, and brushes with the law. In such circumstances mentoring relationships tend to collapse along with everything else. Shiner et al.’s study recognises that more successful mentoring relationships anticipate a stop-start rhythm and always include an element of ‘firefighting’.





As my final case study I turn to a neighbouring family of interventions, namely ‘peer education’. In the nineties, there was a fad for interventions based on close encounters of a different kind, namely that between peers. Peer support was premised on brain waives such as the following: ‘the grapevine already exists, so let’s make positive use of it’; or ‘let’s get hold of the hard-to-reach by using those already there’. In the language of this chapter, gains were perceived to flow from pursing interventions promulgated within the same reference group as the recipient.

My illustration here makes use of but one primary investigation (Mellanby et al., 2001). My purpose is to illustrate a couple of further advantages of the middle range portfolio. In crossing to yet another policy domain (in this case sex education), I reprise a stock point about ‘conjoining different spheres of social behaviour’. The main intention, however, is to simulate how middle range programme synthesis deals with discordant findings. At the time, this particular study fetched up surprising results and I want to show how such ‘ignorance’, carefully specified, can be overcome with a well-crafted auxiliary theory. Those ancillary ideas, once formalised, then await service in explaining empirical things to come.

The intervention in question, known as A Pause, was aimed at youngsters on the threshold of sexual experience. It was designed to keep them in this category for a while longer and to warn of the consequences and dangers of too reckless a leap into sexual activity. As with many social interventions, these aims are not as concordant as they first appear and here lie the roots of an unanticipated pattern of outcomes. Mellanby and colleagues examined two versions of the programmes, one delivered in traditional style by teachers and healthcare staff, and one implemented in the then new mode of peer education (by slightly older fellow students to be precise). The finding of interest is a crossover on the dual aims of the scheme. Peer leaders ‘were more successful in establishing conservative attitudes related to sexual behaviour’, whilst adults ‘were more successful in their warning about pregnancy and sexually transmitted disease’. The paper is very much in empirical reportage style and attempts little more than to recount what, at the time, were seen as perplexing findings.

The methodological point here is that these anomalous findings are grist to the mill of reference group theory. A couple of auxiliary propositions (recall figure 5) are all that is needed to make them fall into line. The supplementary hypotheses are once again mapped onto the template of Table 1. Table 4 incorporates some simple ideas about ‘vectors of influence’, or pulling power if you will, of the respective reference group positions created by the intervention. The programme subjects are another example of our much-loved ‘marginals’, aspiring to have sex but not in position to deal with all of its consequences. In this instance, programme practitioners (the educators) are also incorporated into the table in the guise of shaded circles. In the case of the teachers and health workers this is achieved by modifying the table to include a column of members as well as the customary non-members. In the case of peer educators, these are, of course, non-members, who potentially could hold any of the out-group positions. But, in terms of calls to abstinence from sex, they are located in the resistant column.  The revised explanatory propositions are also mapped as lines of influence, which in brief, can be expressed as follows:
	The salient reference group for developing risk aversion in marginal locations lies in the category of full members (especially from expert members ones with know-how in relation to the hazards).
	The salient reference group for stifling ambition in marginal locations lies with groups even further from full membership. The inclination to stay put is best fostered by the resilient and the resistant (especially if they outnumber the marginals).






Table 4: Vectors of influence in sex education superimposed
 onto the out-group typology 
Categories of membership	Categories of	non-membership
Full member	Promoting risk-aversion1.Candidate for membership	2. Marginal non-member
Detached member	3. Potential member	4. Detached non-memberStifling ambition
Disaffected member	5. Autonomous non-member	6. Antagonistic non-member






This chapter has sought to connect the aspirations of policy evaluation with the methodology of sociological middle-range theory. There is, of course, a more disconcerting resemblance between the two parent domains. Both policy making and sociological thinking are capable of shaming the advertising industry in the regularity of their claims for ‘new, improved’ products. Sociologist, I fear, never tire of proclaiming ‘paradigm shifts’, ‘breakthroughs’, ‘re-orientations’, ‘intellectual revolutions’. Political longevity turns increasingly on the ability to convince the voters that policies and programmes are perpetually ‘modernising’, that they face ‘emerging threats’, and that they offer unending ‘new deals’.

If we are to avoid this pervasive whiff of snake oil, two real remedies are in order. The first is to appreciate that there is nothing entirely new under the sun in policy making. Programme theories always evolve, re-permutating old ideas in the face of chronic problems. Programme success, correspondingly, is always conditional and we have begun to learn the importance of following the context-specific contours. Secondly and similarly, it must be recognised that sociological knowledge claims are always limited in scope. There are no social laws. But careful abstraction does allow us to generate middle-range propositions which account for a degree of regularity across time and place. New times and new places will always find these theories wanting. This does render middle-range theories wrong, however, merely in need of ever better specification.
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^1	  This paper is based on a long and rambling polemic entitled ‘Whatever happened to middle-range theory?’, first delivered at the International Sociology Congress, Stockholm, 2005. The author would like to thank Frans Leeuw and Jos Vaessen for editing it into a shorter and more cogent piece on policy research. All errors and inconsistencies remain the responsibility of the author.
^2	  The capacity to be able to explain everything is a feature of totalitarianism rather than enlightenment. The best know example is Marxism’s win-win explanation of both acquiescence (false consciousness) and revolutionary fervour (collective consciousness) in the working classes. Whichever the actuality, the theory is correct.
^3	  One mistaken reading of ‘middle’ range theory is that it applies only to the meso ‘group’ or ‘institutional’ layers of society and thus doe not pertain at the macro ‘societal’ or ‘cultural’ strata, nor at the micro ‘individual’ and ‘personal’ levels. This is perhaps an understandable error, since Merton’s substantive preoccupation is group behaviour. He is quite clear, however, that ‘middle’ refers to a level of abstraction. It would be perfectly possible to have, say, an ethnomethodological middle range theory of conversational openings, or a comparative-historical middle range theory of industrialisation. 
^4	  Merton’s rather urbane prose becomes decidedly prickly when discussing the unintelligibility and imprecision prevailing in much theoretical discourse. Many theorists, he scolds, favour the ‘avalanche of words’, the quest for ‘architectonic splendour’, and the pursuit of ‘length rather than lucidity’.
^5	  The pervasiveness of social patterning is a phenomenon that still surprises and needs to be rediscovered periodically. A recent example is Buchanan M (2007) The Social Atom: Why the Rich Get Richer, Cheaters Get Caught, and Your Neighbor Usually Looks Like You. 
^6	  Looking ahead for a moment, I note that capacity of policy makers to think in terms of these rather soluble patterns. In the UK, much policy attention in directed at NEETS (those not in education, employment or training). It is appreciated, however, that there is significant ‘churn’ in membership of this group.
^7	  I have made the case for the affinity between middle range theory and realist explanation on a previous occasion (Pawson, 2000). Merton, somewhat before other realist thinkers, made extensive use the imagery of explanation as ‘identifying the social mechanism’ (e.g. 1967: 43). 
^8	  I have retained the phrase ‘marginal man’ for this group as a symbol of the antiquity of theory. The expression echoed an empirical study much celebrated at the time (Stonequist, 1937). Whilst this relic of language does not survive, the wannerbe-but-cannerbe orientation it signifies certainly does. 
^9	  Merton went little beyond simple classifications and typologies to achieve the necessary levels of clarity and precision. Some of his followers have preferred to forefront this feature as the prime characteristic of middle range theory and use axiomatic, logical and mathematical formulations to express explanatory propositions (e.g. Zetterberg, 1966; Berger, Zelditch and Anderson , 1966).
^10	  The relevance of middle-range theory to problem solving is discussed in a much earlier, little known essay (Merton 1949).
^11	  There is a subsidiary claim embedded in this thesis. The paper can only be considered as an attempt to specify a little more clearly the function of ‘theory’ in ‘theory-driven’ evaluation. Even within this school, there are differences between those who prefer a ‘theory-of-change’ perspective and a ‘systems theory perspectives’ and a ‘realist theory perspective’. This paper is an attempt to install ‘middle-range theory’ more firmly into the club.
^12	  Needless to say there are a range of quite different perspectives on how to pull the evidence together. I will not enter these debates here other that to provide a reference to a viewpoint quite different to my own (Petticrew and Roberts, 2005).
^13	  In particular, I only make fleeting reference to the primary studies upon which the emerging middle-range theories are built. A proper synthesis pays much more care to methodological provenance and standards of these key sources of evidence. Readers interested in the careful dissection of the studies cited here should consult Pawson (2006) and the companion website: www.leeds.ac.uk/realistsynthesesis
^14	 Renamed the Car Crimes Index in 1997
